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Perceptual Objectivity and Consciousness: A Relational Response 
to Burge’s Challenge 
 
Naomi Eilan1 
 
Abstract My question is: does phenomenal consciousness 
have a critical role in explaining the way conscious per- 
ceptions achieve objective import? I approach it through 
developing a dilemma I label ‘Burge’s Challenge’, which is 
implicit in his approach to perceptual objectivity. It says, 
crudely: either endorse the general structure of his account 
of how objective perceptual import is achieved (an account I 
label ‘Caused Representation’), and give up on a role for 
consciousness. Or, relinquish Caused Representation, and 
possibly defend a role for consciousness. Someone I call 
Burge* holds we should embrace the first horn of the 
dilemma. A second response, roughly the relationalist ap- 
proach, opts for the second horn. The third option, implicit 
in many current approaches to perceptual consciousness, is 
to reject the dilemma. The paper argues for a version of the 
second response. The key argument turns on the develop- 
ment of a sceptical challenge to justify the assumption that 
we perceive particular intrinsic property instantiations, 
rather than their structural equivalents. The suggestion will 
be that only the relationalist approach can meet it in the way 
we think it is met. If this is right, there is a prima facie case 
for taking relationalist responses to the dilemma seriously. I 
end with two objections to this response, which might be 
made by the real Burge in defence of opting for the first horn 
of the dilemma, and by phenomenal intentionalists in de- 
fence of rejecting the dilemma. I use discussion of these to 
highlight one of the main issues that should be pursued in 
order to make good the claim that we should embrace the 
horn of the dilemma that Burge*  rejects. 
 
 
Keywords Perceptual objectivity · Perceptual 
consciousness  · Acquaintance · Relationalism · Burge 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Tyler Burge’s official target in Origins of Objectivity is a 
position he calls ‘Individual Representationalism’, accord- 
ing to which ‘constitutive conditions on objective repre- 
sentation must be represented by the individual if the 
individual is to engage in objective representation’. Applied 
to perceptual objectivity, he argues, this over-intellectual- 
izes the requirements.
1 
But there is also another, equally 
important target, or, if this sounds too directed, casualty of 
his positive account of perceptual objectivity. This is the 
idea, often only vaguely presupposed, that phenomenal 
consciousness has a critical role in explaining the way 
conscious perceptions achieve objective import. It is his 
powerful critique, sometimes implicit, of this idea that I am 
calling ‘Burge’s Challenge’. It can be presented in the form 
of a dilemma, with Burge’s approach to perceptual objec- 
tivity in effect amounting to endorsement of one of its 
horns. In contrast, much current writing on perception can 
be seen, implicitly at least, as rejecting the exhaustiveness 
of the dilemma. Crudely, I will argue that Burge is right 
about the dilemma, but wrong in the horn he opts for. 
Although I will be drawing on claims Burge actually 
makes, and will cite them where appropriate, as he doesn’t 
explicitly formulate the dilemma, I will from now on call it 
‘Burge*’s dilemma’ and attribute arguments in defence of  
it and the horn he chooses to Burge*. In this section I give 
an informal description of the issues it addresses and use 
 
1 
For an introduction to the idea  of Individual  Representationalism 
see Burge (2010: 12–22). 
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this to introduce the structure of the paper. Throughout, I 
will be discussing visual  perception. 
The two basic claims that provide the background to 
Burge*’s dilemma are these. First, normally, when you see 
a physical, mind-independent object you are aware, or 
conscious, of it. It is phenomenally present to you. Call this 
the ‘ofness of consciousness’. Second, when you see such 
an object, your perception is ‘of’ the object in the sense that 
in virtue of perceiving it you are in a position to make non- 
inferential judgments that refer to it and ascribe mind-in- 
dependent properties to it. Call this the ‘ofness of objective 
import’. The general background question is: what, if 
anything, is the relation between these two senses in which 
a perception is ‘of’ the object perceived. The more specific 
version of the question, which will be our concern 
throughout, is this: in explaining what gives a conscious 
perception objective import should we appeal to what 
makes it yield consciousness, or phenomenal presence, of 
the  object perceived? 
Burge* says ‘no’. His rejection is based on two claims. 
The first says that a perception of an object, whether 
conscious or not, has objective import in virtue of the 
perceived object causing the occurrence of a perceptual 
state with representational contents. The second claim says 
that we can give an exhaustive account of objective import, 
thus explained, without essential recourse to whatever it is 
that delivers phenomenal presence. The Burge* dilemma, 
given these two claims, in its first crude formulation, is as 
follows. Either endorse his account of objective  import, 
and relinquish any idea you might have to the effect that 
phenomenal presence plays a constitutive role in delivering 
objective import; or, relinquish his account of objective 
import (and, possibly, defend the intuition that phenomenal 
presence delivers a distinctive kind of objective import that 
only conscious  perceptions have). 
Burge* holds we should embrace the first horn of the 
dilemma. I think it is right to say that many current writers 
on perceptual consciousness, on the other hand, would, if 
only implicitly, reject the dilemma. They would say that  
for conscious perceptions, ‘consciousness of’ is directly 
implicated in delivering objective import, and, at the same 
time, that objective import is to be explained as Burge* 
explains it. This is, for example, a natural way of reading 
representational theories of phenomenal character—such 
representations, when suitably caused, are said to deliver 
both consciousness of the object and objective import. It is 
also, as I understand them, the upshot of at least some 
claims made by ‘phenomenal intentionalists’ (discussed in 
the final section of the  paper).
2
 
 
2 For a representative use of phenomenology to argue for the ‘content 
view’ see Siegel (2010); for a summary of the phenomenal 
intentionality approach see Kriegel and Horgan (2008). 
An alternative response is to accept the dilemma but to 
embrace the horn Burge* rejects. To do so is to say that the 
phenomenal presence of perceived objects should be ap- 
pealed to in explaining the kind of objective import con- 
scious perceptions have, but that this requires dropping 
Burge*’s account of objective import. Although not explic- 
itly formulated as a response to the dilemma, this is, in effect, 
what ‘relational’ theories of phenomenal character say. 
In the next two sections I lay out in more detail the claims 
that inform the dilemma, and the Burgean* endorsement of 
its first horn. In section 4, I set out the main argument I want 
to have before us in favour of a role for phenomenal pres- 
ence in explaining objective import. The remainder of the 
paper  examines  the  responses  to  the  argument available 
(a) to Burge*, (b) to those who endorse his account of ob- 
jective import but reject the dilemma, and (c) to those who 
accept  the dilemma but choose the opposite horn. 
I will be arguing for a version of option (c). To an- 
ticipate: we normally assume that the concepts we use in 
perception-based judgments refer to particular mind-inde- 
pendent properties, rather than to structural  equivalents, 
and that it is the instantiation of such intrinsic or catego- 
rical properties that render our judgments true or false. I 
formulate a sceptical challenge to this assumption and ar- 
gue that neither options (a) nor (b) can meet it in the way 
we intuitively think it is met, but that a relational version of 
(c) can. If this is right, there is a prima facie case for taking 
relationalist responses to the dilemma seriously. I end with 
two objections to this response, which might be made by 
the real Burge in defence of option (a), and by phenomenal 
intentionalists in defence of option (b). I use discussion of 
these to highlight one of the main issues that should be 
pursued in order to make good the claim that we should 
embrace the horn of the dilemma that Burge* rejects. 
 
 
2 Burge*’s Challenge 
 
It is notoriously difficult to give an uncontroversial account 
of what ‘sees’ means in locutions such as ‘S sees O’, where 
these refer to cases of ‘object seeing’, which, following 
Fred Dretske, I will call ‘simple seeing’ (the contrast is 
with ‘epistemic seeing’, ‘seeing that’). One claim, made for 
example by Dretske, is that it is internal to the meaning of 
‘sees’ in such cases that when S sees O she is aware, or 
conscious, of Dretske (1997). Whether or not one thinks of 
it as internal to the meaning or as a background assump- 
tion, though, most people would agree that normally, when 
S sees O, S is conscious of O. As this is normally under- 
stood (though not necessarily by Dretske), such con- 
sciousness yields phenomenal presence of the object to the 
subject. I will call this claim Consciousness. This claim is 
not contested by any of the participants in the debate. 
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Many, if not most, writers about perceptual experience 
are direct realists. As such they would endorse some ver- 
sion of the following statement. Perceptions have imme- 
diate objective import in the sense that they provide us with 
the basis for immediate non-inferential judgments about 
mind-independent objects and some of their mind-inde- 
pendent properties. The most common contrast is with the 
kind of indirect realism that says that perceptions provide 
us only with sense-data on the basis of which we entertain 
hypotheses about their causes. I will label this claim Ob- 
jective Import. This claim too is not contested by any of the 
participants in the  debate. 
One question is: how do conscious perceptions achieve 
their objective import? The most common answer, which 
Burge endorses and elaborates, is this. A perception is a 
perception of a particular mind-independent physical ob- 
ject, in the objective import sense, in virtue of its repre- 
sentational contents being assessable for accuracy relative 
to the state of the object that causes the occurrence of the 
perceptual state.
3 
I will call this claim Caused Represen- 
tation. This is the  first  contested claim. 
A second question is: does the possession by a conscious 
perception of objective import constitutively depend on the 
fact that the perception delivers phenomenal presence of the 
object perceived? More specifically, in cases of conscious 
perception, does phenomenal presence deliver a special 
kind of objective import, not possessed by non-conscious 
perceptions? The point of this question can be brought out 
by having before us the much discussed case of blindsight, 
in which, due to a particular brain lesion, subjects are not 
conscious of retinotopically defined regions in their visual 
field (Weiskrantz 1986/2009; Weiskrantz 2002; Cowey 
2010). They say they have no experiences of anything in 
that region; but, when asked, are well above chance in an- 
swering questions about it, questions about the orientation 
of a line in that region, for example. On most accounts, we 
should conclude that their perceptions represent some 
properties of objects in the ‘blind’ field, despite the absence 
of conscious experience of them (but see caveat below). Our 
question is: does the absence of perceptual consciousness in 
such cases mean that their perceptions lack the kind of 
objective import possessed by normal perceptions that do 
yield consciousness of the perceived environment? 
Burge* would answer ‘no’. According to him, the way 
perceptions achieve objective import, and explanations 
thereof, are both wholly independent of perceptual con- 
sciousness and explanations thereof. Burge himself cites the 
case of blindsight as a demonstration of this independence: 
everything there is to say about perceptual objective import 
applies    to   such    cases,    but   there   is   no   perceptual 
consciousness (see, e.g., Burge 2010: 188, 368, 376). This is 
based on the idea that the possession by a perception of any 
given representational content is not sufficient for percep- 
tual consciousness. Adding a causal relation between the 
object and the state does not alter the situation. So we can 
give an exhaustive account of perceptual objective import 
without bringing in consciousness at all. I will call this 
claim Independence. It is the second contested claim. 
The point being made by the Independence claim is 
simple. Specifying the representational content of an ex- 
perience is a matter of specifying (a) how the world must be 
if the perception is veridical, and (b) how it is represented. 
The basic intuition is that for any such representational 
content, it is possible for a non-conscious perception to have 
it. The addition of the requirement, on the Caused Repre- 
sentation claim, that the occurrence of the state with such 
contents be caused by the perceived object does not intro- 
duce a role for consciousness. Perceptual objectivity is 
constitutively independent of perceptual consciousness. 
That is the challenge. The contrasting view introduces 
the last claim I want to have in place in this section. I will 
call it Phenomenal Objectivity (PO). It insists, contra In- 
dependence, that consciousness does play a role in deliv- 
ering a distinctive kind of objective import, possessed only 
by conscious perceptions. Recently the claim has, perhaps, 
been most explicitly made by philosophers who adopt one 
of the many versions of the ‘phenomenal intentionality’ 
claim, and I return to some of these in the last section. But 
it is important for my purposes that PO be introduced and 
recognized as a background assumption in much writing 
about perception. It underlies, for example, many, often 
differently motivated, claims that we find in the literature  
to the effect that consciousness of an object is what puts 
one in a position to use demonstrative concepts in making 
perception-based judgments about it; that it plays a role in 
making knowledge possible; that it has a role in rational- 
izing judgments, and so forth.
4 
The intuition is that pres- 
ence of the object grounds these capacities, in some way 
and in some sense, and that the way it does so should enter 
into an account of the objective import of conscious per- 
ceptions. This is the third contested claim. 
With Caused Representation, Independence and Phe- 
nomenal Objectivity in play, we are now in a position to 
formulate the Burge* dilemma: either accept both Caused 
Representation and Independence (and reject Phenomenal 
Objectivity); or reject Caused Representation (and, possi- 
bly, defend Phenomenal Objectivity). Burge* chooses the 
first horn of the dilemma. A defender of PO will reject 
Independence. There are two ways of doing so. One is to 
endorse Caused Representation, but to say that there is a 
 
  
3 For an elaboration of Burge’s own version of Caused Represen- 
tation see Burge (2010:  30–59). 
4 
For a variety of such claims see, e.g., Campbell (2002), Roessler 
(2009), Smithies (2011). 
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kind of representational content that suffices for con- 
sciousness of the object perceived. To say this is to reject 
the dilemma and to insist that there is a third option con- 
sisting in a version of Caused Representation plus PO. The 
other is to accept the dilemma but to reject Caused Rep- 
resentation, and to say that conscious perceptions do have a 
distinctive kind of objective import that is constitutively 
bound up with phenomenal presence, but which cannot be 
explained by appeal to the Caused Representation account 
of objective import. As I noted in the introduction, this is, 
in effect, what relational theories of phenomenal character 
do. 
In section 4 I will set out the argument for PO that I 
want to have before us, which comes in response to a 
sceptical challenge. Subsequent sections will examine the 
difference between caused-representation and relational 
theories of objective import relative to the question of how 
and whether they can avail themselves of the central in- 
tuition underpinning this argument for PO. In the next 
section, by way of completing the introduction to the 
problem, I say something about how, if you endorse Bur- 
ge*’s Caused Representation and Independence, you 
should account for the kind of ‘consciousness of’ that we 
find in normal cases of  perception. 
Before proceeding any further, though, a substantive 
caveat about appeals to blindsight is in order. According to 
(the real) Burge, perceptual objectivity requires perceptual 
constancy, the capacity to represent properties as the same 
despite radically different proximal stimulation; and he 
claims that this is achieved in blindsight (I say more about 
his appeal to constancy in section 8). In fact, though, as Ian 
Phillips points out, researchers working on blindsight have 
found no clear evidence for constancy (Phillips 2014). As 
Phillips also notes, there are, in addition, considerable dif- 
ficulties in formulating uncontroversial criteria for the ab- 
sence of consciousness in such cases. This suggests that, as 
things currently stand, philosophers are best advised to treat 
the blindseer as a creature of a thought experiment, akin to 
zombies and Ned Block’s superblindseer. At any rate, for 
the rest of this paper, I will take it that it is under some such 
description that Burge* appeals to blindsight. I shall call the 
condition he maintains is conceivable ‘blindsight*’. A 
subject who suffers from this condition can, on the basis of 
perceptual information, issue accurate guesses about a wide 
range of properties in particular regions of his visual field, 
despite the absence of consciousness of these  properties. 
 
 
3 Perceptual Consciousness and Independence 
 
If you endorse Burge*’s Caused Representation and Inde- 
Suppose you appeal to blindsight* to argue that the mere 
possession by a perceiver of information that meets the 
Caused Representation requirement is not sufficient for 
consciousness in the following senses. One can be in such a 
state, but: (a) there is no access consciousness (the per- 
ceptual input is not ‘poised for the rational control of 
thought, speech and action’); (b) there is no phenomenal 
consciousness (there is no experience, nothing it is like to 
be in such a state);
5 
and (c) there is no consciousness of the 
environment. Let us say, finally, that in the absence of 
consciousness  in  these  senses,  the  object  is  not  ‘phe- 
nomenally present’ to the  subject. 
The task for the defender of Caused Representation and 
Independence is to give an account of phenomenal pres- 
ence that is consistent with both. The absence of access 
consciousness is easily dealt with. For the perception to be 
access conscious it must serve as input to the subject’s 
reasoning system. When it doesn’t, the objective import of 
the perception is the same as when it does, all that is 
lacking is the causal link with other systems. As to phe- 
nomenal consciousness, the obvious line to take is to say 
that its absence in blindsight is due the absence of sensa- 
tional, i.e. non-representational, properties. As to ‘con- 
sciousness of’, for this to be in play the claim will be: the 
representation must be both access conscious and accom- 
panied by sensational properties. When it is, we have in 
play what we in fact call ‘presence’ of the object to the 
subject. But the objective import of the perception is still 
exhaustively explained by appeal to the caused represen- 
tational contents of the  experience. 
Note, someone who takes this line might even concede 
that, as a matter of fact, sensational properties play a causal 
role in making some perceptual contents access conscious. 
In this sense they have a causal role in making it the case 
that the contents of the representation are accessible to the 
subject. But all of this is consistent with claiming that an 
explanation of objective import will appeal to no more than 
the material appealed to by Caused Representation. 
 
 
4 The Sceptic’s Challenge and a First Defence 
of  Phenomenal Objectivity 
 
One of the virtues of Burge*’s Challenge is that it forces 
clarity about often vaguely presupposed roles for phe- 
nomenal consciousness in delivering objective import. The 
account just sketched of perceptual consciousness is quite 
powerful, and a first question for vague intuitions to the 
effect that Phenomenal Objectivity is right is to ask whe- 
ther those intuitions are catered for by the account of 
perceptual consciousness just sketched. If you think they 
pendence, how should you account for the kind of ‘con-    
sciousness of’  that we  find in normal cases of perception? 5  For this distinction see Block (1995). 
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are, you are not denying Independence as I have set it out. 
So the first challenge here for a defender of PO is to come 
up with a formulation of PO that the defender of Inde- 
pendence  would reject. 
The second challenge is to come up with an argument 
for PO that doesn’t consist simply in bald denial of Inde- 
pendence. In particular, what is needed is an account of 
what it is we think we have, as far as objective import is 
concerned, in cases of normal conscious perceptions, which 
the combination of Caused Representation and Indepen- 
dence doesn’t give us. I begin with the second task here, 
and turn to the second in later sections. 
Suppose you see an object and on that basis judge: ‘There 
is a rectangular red table in front of me’. Normally we 
would make the following assumptions about such judg- 
ments. (1) They are made true or false by the state of the 
mind-independent object you see. (2) The concepts you use 
in such judgments, in this case ‘rectangular’ and ‘red’, refer 
to particular intrinsic properties rather than to structural 
equivalents, and it is the instantiation of such properties that 
will render your judgment true or false. (3) Your perception 
provides you with access to these instantiated  properties. 
And now suppose that a sceptic asks you: how do you 
know that the property instance you see is, in fact, one 
intrinsic or categorical property, rather than one of limitless 
structurally equivalent properties? By a ‘structurally 
equivalent property’ the sceptic means a property that 
satisfies the  same  structural description.
6, 7
 
The most natural and immediate answer is that you know 
because you are presented through perception with instances 
of intrinsic properties, of redness or rectangularity, say, 
rather than with structural equivalents. They, rather than 
their structural equivalents, are phenomenally present to you. 
The intuition underlying this response also lies behind 
many claims to the effect that phenomenal consciousness 
gives us a particular distinctive kind of access to features of 
the world that we would lack in its absence. One way of 
bringing out the force of the intuition is this: suppose you 
asked a blindseer* how they know that the property you 
are issuing a guess about is ‘red’ rather than a structural 
equivalent? And compare the blindseer*’s situation with 
that of a normal perceiver faced with the same question. 
The intuition is that the normal perceiver will have an 
answer available that the blindseer* won’t: namely that he 
 
6 
There has been much debate about, and refinement of, the notion of 
an ‘intrinsic’ property. I am using the term very loosely, to mean only 
a non-structural property, and, in this context, will use ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘categorical’ interchangeably. 
7 
This challenge is a generalised and highly simplified version of a 
central problem Newman raises for Russell’s structuralist account of 
our knowledge of the external world in The Analysis of Matter (see 
Newman 1928). For a discussion of Newman’s argument that relates 
it to the matters we are considering see Eilan (2013). 
is presented with the property instance. It’s that property 
the normal perceiver will say, a possibility not there for the 
blindseer to pursue because nothing is presented to him. 
This is a powerful intuition, one which provides us with 
a prima facie motivation for Phenomenal Objectivity. It 
suggests that appeal to phenomenal presence has a role in 
justifying our claim to know that our perception-based 
judgments are rendered true or false by the instantiation of 
particular intrinsic properties. By way of beginning to ar- 
ticulate the intuition, I turn to the following question. Can 
someone who adopts the basic outlines of Burge*’s account 
of objective import, i.e. adopts the Caused Representation 
claim, avail herself of this kind of response to the sceptic? 
 
 
5 The Causal Clause 
 
On Burge*’s account of objective perceptual import, recall, 
perceptions are perceptions of a particular mind-indepen- 
dent physical object, in the objective import sense of ‘of’, if 
their representational content is made true or false by the 
state of that object; and if the object is the cause of the 
occurrence of the state with that content. My interest here is 
in the causal clause, which rests on adoption of some ver- 
sion of the Causal Theory of Perception (CTP). For our 
purposes, the CTP is any theory that says that when S 
consciously perceives O, S is in an experiential state that is 
caused by O. To focus on the case of vision, the key claim 
here is that the visual experience and the object are causally 
related ‘separate existences’, where this is understood as 
entailing that the phenomenal character of any particular 
experience can be explained without essential appeal to the 
object that in fact causes the occurrence of the experience.
8 
Consider again the sceptical challenge, which is to justify 
the claim that you know that the property instance you see is, 
in fact, one intrinsic or categorical property, rather than one 
of limitless structural equivalents. Can a defender of CTP 
appeal to the phenomenal character of experience to deliver 
such a justification? The immediate answer must be ‘no’. It is 
an article of faith in all versions of the theory that the phe- 
nomenal character of an experience cannot extend beyond 
whatever is delivered by narrow representational content, 
perhaps plus sensational properties. Given this commitment, 
how things seem to the subject when she is seeing an instance 
of red, say, cannot suffice to rule out the claim that the ex- 
perience is caused by an instance of an external structurally 
equivalent property. For all her experiences tell her, it could 
be any one of structurally identical properties that is causing 
 
8 
Of course there are other ways in which we might appeal to 
causation and causal explanation when accounting for what percep- 
tion is, that do not commit to the separate existence claim. From now 
on, though, when I speak of the CTP, I will have this stipulative 
definition in mind. The locus classicus of the theory is Grice (1989). 
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the experience—this is not something experience ‘as it pre- 
sents itself to us’ can rule out. 
Adoption of the CTP appears to rule out a priori ap- 
pealing to how things seem in experience to respond to the 
sceptic. In this sense, if this account of perceptual experi- 
ence is right, a normal perceiver would be in no better a 
position that a blindseer in responding to the sceptic’s 
challenge. On this theory, whatever it is that goes into 
explaining phenomenal presence, or ‘consciousness of’, 
will not support a response of the kind we imagined a 
defender of Perceptual Objectivity would use to distinguish 
blindseers from normal perceivers. 
Where does this leave us? Burge*’s challenge, recall, 
was: either accept his account of objective import, as ren- 
dered by the Caused Representation claim, and reject Phe- 
nomenal Objectivity; or reject Caused Representation (and, 
possibly, defend Phenomenal Objectivity). The sceptical 
challenge we have been considering appears to vindicate the 
dilemma at least to the following extent. Adopting Caused 
Representation would appear to rule out appealing to phe- 
nomenal presence to justify our belief that our perceptions 
have the objective import we believe them to have with 
respect to intrinsic  properties of objects we perceive. 
In the next section I consider the response a relationalist 
will make to the sceptic, which involves embracing the 
horn Burge* rejects. And in the last section I briefly discuss 
an attempt that might be made by ‘phenomenal intention- 
alists’ to save a combination of Caused Representation and 
Perceptual Objectivity. Before that, a few brief words  
about the way someone who adopts Burge*’s horn of the 
dilemma might respond to the sceptic’s challenge. Burge* 
himself would, of course, make no appeal to phenomenal 
presence to respond to the sceptic and would therefore be 
unmoved by the particular complaint against Caused 
Representation that we have been considering. How then 
would he respond to the request to justify the idea that a 
perception-based judgment such as ‘This object is rectan- 
gular’ is rendered true or false by the instantiation of 
rectangularity rather than one of limitless structural 
equivalents? The most plausible type of move to make 
would be something along the following lines. Nature 
comes carved at categorical-property joints; we have 
evolved to respond in perception to these natural proper- 
ties. The reference of the concepts we use in perception- 
based judgments is causally constrained by our percep- 
tions, which, in turn, are causally constrained by these 
natural properties. And that is how we can justify the claim 
that our perceptions are perceptions of particular catego- 
rical properties rather than of structural equivalents.
9
 
 
9 In proposing this response on Burge*’s behalf, I combine two  
claims to be found in Lewis’s ‘Putnam’s Paradox’ (1984), each 
proposed as a response to a related challenge. 
My own view is that this kind of response suffices, for- 
mally, as a response to the particular sceptical challenge we 
have been considering. But, in a way, it just serves to rein- 
force the intuitions underlying Phenomenal Objectivity. We 
don’t think we need to rely on such theoretical, roundabout 
justifications. We think we only need to rely on what our 
experiences themselves deliver in responding to the sceptic. 
By way of bringing this home, consider again that on the kind 
of story just sketched we are in no better a position than are 
blindseers to meet the sceptic’s challenge. But we think we 
are in a far better position in this respect. I suggest the 
strength of this intuition alone suffices for seeing whether 
there are other ways of explaining Phenomenal Objectivity, 
ones that would allow us to appeal to phenomenal presence 
to justify our beliefs that we perceive particular intrinsic 
properties rather than structural equivalents. 
 
 
6 The Relational Response10 
 
Suppose, instead, you adopt a relational approach to ex- 
plaining Phenomenal Objectivity. Can you do better in re- 
sponding to the sceptic, thereby coming closer to vindicating 
a role for consciousness in delivering objective import? 
The central feature I am interested in highlighting in 
relationalism turns on its rejection of the causal clause in 
Caused Representation. To say that perceptual experiences 
are essentially relational, as I will be interpreting it, is to 
say that the object perceived is a constituent of instances of 
the experiential relation (rather than being a cause of the 
experience, as on the CTP). The version I want to have 
before us draws on the concept of ‘acquaintance’ to spell 
out what perceptual experiential relations are; and the 
following two passages from Russell capture the features of 
acquaintance I want to highlight. First, in his popular ex- 
position in Problems of Philosophy, after defining ac- 
quaintance as ‘knowledge of things’, contrasted with 
knowledge of truths, he  writes: 
We shall say we have acquaintance with anything of 
which we are directly aware without the intermediary 
of any process of inference or the knowledge of 
truths. Thus in the presence of my table I am ac- 
quainted with the sense-data that make up the ap- 
pearance of my table—its colour, shape, hardness, 
smoothness etc. (Russell 1912:  46–47) 
 
10  As I will develop it, the relational response appeals specifically     
to a non-causal  relation  of  Russellian  acquaintance  with  objects,  
in a way that is perhaps closest to Campbell (2002, 2005, 2009). 
However, most theories which treat objects as constituents,  rather 
than causes, of experience, or endorse na ı¨ve realism, in Mike Martin’s 
sense, will be able to avail themselves of many of the central claims I 
will make on behalf of the relational theory as I develop it. See, e.g., 
Martin (2002), and Brewer  (2011). 
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Russell’s descriptions of the ontological category to 
which sense-data belong underwent various, sometimes 
puzzling permutations, and drawing on his writings in ex- 
plaining the relational account of experience inevitably 
involves a certain amount of tidying up and interpretation. 
That said, the examples he gives of sense-data here suggest 
a reading on which they should be treated as instantiated 
properties.
11 
Such instantiated properties are an example of 
what Russell called ‘simple objects’. Russell also said we 
are acquainted with complex objects, where again ac- 
quaintance is treated as knowledge of things, independent 
of knowledge of truths. An example of a complex object is 
a particular sense-datum with an assortment of instantiated 
properties—redness and roundness, say—where the idea is 
that we are acquainted with the object by being acquainted 
with these instantiated properties (see Russell 1913). 
The relationalist response I will be considering extends 
this idea to external objects and their properties and says 
that when we see, say, a table, we are acquainted not with a 
complex sense-datum and its properties, but, rather, with 
the table itself and some of its instantiated properties. The 
critical point as far as such an extension is concerned is 
captured in the highlighted sentence in the following pas- 
sage in ‘The Nature of  Sense-Data’. 
Presentation (or acquaintance) is a two-term relation 
of a subject (or better of an act) to a single (simple or 
complex)  object… From  the  fact  that  the presenta- 
tion is a two-term relation, the question of truth or 
phenomenally present to us are mind-independent, and, in 
this sense, objective properties. 
With this in place, let us now return to the sceptic. His 
challenge is to justify the claim that you know you are 
perceiving particular categorical properties rather than 
structural equivalents when you issue perception-based 
judgments such as: ‘This table is rectangular’. As we saw, a 
defender of Phenomenal Objectivity who endorses Caused 
Representation cannot appeal to how things seem in ex- 
perience to silence the sceptic because on Caused Repre- 
sentation, how things seem in perceptual experience is 
consistent with the experience of rectangularity being 
caused by a structural equivalent. But on the relational 
approach, there is no causal gap between how things seem, 
in cases of perceptual acquaintance, and how they are. And 
there is nothing you can reach for in describing how things 
seem to you other than the properties of the perceived 
object. The sceptic’s question cannot get a foothold.12,  13 
With this in place, let us return to Burge*’s dilemma. 
Recall, the basic two claims that provide the background to 
Burge*’s dilemma are these. First, normally, when you see 
an object you are aware, or conscious, of it; it is phe- 
nomenally present to you. This is what I called the ‘ofness 
of consciousness’. Second, when you see an object, your 
perception is ‘of’ the object in the sense that the perception 
enables non-inferential judgments about the object. This is 
what I called the ‘ofness of objective import’. The general 
background  question  we  have  been  considering  is:  in 
error  cannot  arise  with  regard  to it: in any case of    
presentation there is a certain relation of an act to an 
object, the question of whether there is such an object 
cannot  arise.  (Russell 1913: 76; my emphasis) 
The import of the highlighted passage, when we extend 
acquaintance to external objects, is this. The possibility of 
error does not arise not because acquaintance is conceived of 
as knowledge of infallible truths (as on some current read- 
ings), but rather because it does not involve judgment in the 
first place, and therefore the question of truth and error does 
not arise. It is a two-term relation between subject and object 
that precedes and is independent of knowledge of truths. So, 
while the claim that we have infallible propositional 
knowledge about the objects we experience does mean that 
the objects judged about are not physical objects with mind- 
independent properties—and Russell did in fact think we 
could go on to make infallible judgments about sense-data 
we are acquainted with—the impossibility of error of the 
kind he talks of when explaining acquaintance is wholly 
compatible with the claim that the object and properties 
 
11 Here I am in agreement with Savage (1989). His paper also 
contains an excellent discussion of Russell’s various takes on the 
nature  of sense-data. 
12 This kind of appeal to acquaintance provides only a very crude 
initial statement of the basic idea of a relational theory, and it requires 
various modifications if it is to work as a theory that does justice to 
important features of the phenomenology of experience. For example, 
an immediate and obvious objection is that surely we can and do 
make sense of claims to the effect that things that are rectangular look 
square. At the very least, it is plausible that the relational theory will 
need modification to allow for such cases, for example by thinking of 
perception as a three-place relation between subject, object and 
physical point of view (see for example, Campbell 2005; Brewer 
2011). Note too, that as I have formulated it, the relational theory does 
not exclude the claim that experiences also have representational 
contents. What it insists on denying, for our purposes, is, first, that the 
relation between the experience and the object perceived is causal; 
and, second, that we need to appeal to personal-level representational 
mediation to explain how basic observational properties of mind- 
independent objects ‘make it into’ the phenomenal character of our 
experiences. There is a view of perceptual experiences on which they 
are conceived of as states, the contents of which should be specified 
by appeal to world-dependent senses (see, e.g., McDowell 1996; 
Brewer 1999). Such views would endorse the first, anti-causal claim, 
but reject the second. The arguments I am presenting here do not rule 
out such a rejection. The postulation of ‘world dependent sense’ raises 
distinct issues, to do with the explanatory role of experience with 
respect to concept possession, and are not addressed here directly. On 
this, see,  e.g., Campbell (2002). 
13  For discussion of a similar acquaintance-based move in response  
to Newman’s objection to Russell’s 1927 version of the causal theory 
of perception, see Eilan  (2013). 
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explaining what gives a perception the objective import it 
has, should we appeal to what makes it yield consciousness 
of the object? The Burge* dilemma presented the following 
choice: either explain objective import by appeal to Caused 
Representation, and reject a role for ‘consciousness of’ in 
delivering objective import; or reject Caused Representa- 
tion (and, possibly, give consciousness a role). The rela- 
tional theory opts for the second horn of the dilemma. It 
says that the ofness of objective import in conscious per- 
ceptions is secured by acquaintance with the object and 
some of its instantiated properties, where this entails phe- 
nomenal presence to the subject. This is what distinguishes 
such objective import from the import of, for example, 
blindsighted perception (for which the Caused Represen- 
tation claim may well be right). 
That is the claim—the ‘relational response’ referred to  
in the title. There can be and have been many objections to 
relational theories of perceptual experience, and the rela- 
tional response to the dilemma is only as good as the 
theory’s ability to deal with them. Here I make do with 
responses to two objections, and use these to set out what I 
take to be the most important challenge a relational theory 
must address. The first might be made by the real Burge in 
support of embracing the first horn of the dilemma. The 
second might be made by someone who endorses a ‘phe- 
nomenal intentionalist’ approach to explaining perceptual 
‘consciousness of’ in support of rejecting the dilemma. 
 
 
7 Two  Brief Comparisons 
 
7.1 Burge: The Argument from Science 
 
Burge’s emphatic rejection of a disjunctivist approach to 
perception (see, e.g., Burge 2005) suggests that he would 
not particularly welcome support from relational theories 
for the exhaustiveness of the dilemma I attributed to the 
starred version of himself. His appeal to vision science is 
intended, as I understand it, to ground rejection of both the 
general idea that consciousness has a role in delivering 
objective import, and, specifically, relational versions of 
this idea. Crudely, science falsifies  both. 
According to Burge, we have perception in play, rather 
than mere sensory registration, when we have in play ‘ob- 
jectification’, that is, the separation of ‘local, idiosyncratic 
registrations from representations of individual-indepen- 
dent, occasion-independent, mind-independent, perspec- 
tive-independent reality, beyond the individual. Perceptual 
constancies are capacities for objectification’ (Burge 2010: 
399); and when we have that in play we have ‘representa- 
tional content that is as of a subject matter beyond idiosyn- 
cratic, proximal or subjective features of the individual’ 
(Burge  2010:  397).  How  this  happens  is  explained  by 
scientific psychology in a way that does not require that the 
objectification be done by the individual in virtue of his/her 
capacity to represent the distinction between items idiosyn- 
cratic to the sensory system, on the one hand, and system- 
independent items, on the other. It is achieved by the per- 
ceptual subsystem in a way explained by science (Burge 
2010: 401). The key here is the achievement of perceptual 
constancy in response to variations in proximal stimulation. 
It is this achievement of perceptual constancy that we should 
focus on when explaining objectivity. ‘A perceptual system 
achieves objectification by—and I am inclined to say only 
by—exercising perceptual constancies—given, of course, 
the background of relations to the environment and indi- 
vidual function’ (Burge 2010: 408). Or, ‘the presence of 
perceptual constancies is certainly sufficient for perception 
and objectivity, at least given the environmental and indi- 
vidual-functional background’ (Burge 2010: 413). 
On this account, consciousness has no role to play in se- 
curing what he calls ‘objectification’, and the suggestion 
implicit here is that it therefore can have no role in explaining 
what I have been calling ‘objective import’. Turning now 
specifically to relationalism, Burge’s objection to relational 
accounts is part of his rejection of ‘disjunctivism’, on which 
veridical experiences and hallucinations are said to have 
different phenomenal characters, as there is no phe- 
nomenology-determining object in the hallucinatory case. 
According to Burge, scientific psychology conflicts directly 
with disjunctivism, and with relational theories, because it 
types perceptual states essentially by appeal to the kind of 
objectification achieved in response to proximal stimula- 
tion—which can yield a sameness of perceptual type be- 
tween hallucinations and veridical perceptions—without 
appeal to the object perceived in the veridical case. 
His reasons for rejecting of a role for consciousness in 
general and of relationalist accounts of such a role in 
particular raises many issues, but for our purposes the 
following brief response will have to suffice. David Marr, 
whose book Vision (Marr 1982) introduced philosophers to 
the extraordinary progress made in vision science, and 
forced serious reassessment of what it delivers, says that 
work in this area does not explain consciousness. What he 
means, at least, is that it does not tell us what perceptual 
consciousness is. Consequently, as I read him, he also 
means that vision science has nothing to say about how we 
should type conscious experiences, qua conscious experi- 
ences, and I think he is right. A relational theory is as 
consistent as is a narrow content theory with a narrow 
typing of the causal mechanisms underpinning conscious 
experience, indeed the causal mechanisms that deliver the 
kind of objectification Burge  describes. 
As to the connection between consciousness and 
objectivity, vision science itself does not deliver his claim 
that   science   tells   us   all   there   is   to   say   about how 
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perceptions achieve objective import, as I have defined it. 
Everything Burge says about what science delivers with 
respect to what he calls ‘objectification’ could be true 
(though, in fact, one might have doubts on this front,
14 
but 
it still be the case that in explaining the role perception has 
in grounding non-inferential judgments about the world,  
we do need to appeal to the role of phenomenal presence in 
making the world available to the subject, from her per- 
spective. The sceptic’s argument is one way of bringing 
home why we think consciousness is essential here. 
 
7.2 Phenomenal Intentionality 
 
The ‘phenomenal intentionality programme’ says that there 
is a distinctive kind of intentional content which is essen- 
tially phenomenal, i.e. has a phenomenal character, and is in 
some sense ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’. Developments of these 
claims vary somewhat, but a point in common to all devel- 
opments is that this content is narrow. A good example of the 
application of the latter point to perceptual experience is to 
be found in the following passage, and my comments in what 
follows concern this version of the phenomenal intentionalist 
treatment of perceptual experience. 
When experience presents various apparent objects as 
apparently instantiating properties and relations such 
as shape-properties and relative-position relations, 
experience thereby acquaints the experiencing sub- 
ject with such properties and relations, and this 
mental acquaintance-relation grounds mental refer- 
ence to these properties and relations. Such mental 
reference is wholly constituted phenomenologically. 
It makes no difference, so far as this phenomenally 
constituted and reference-grounding form of ac- 
quaintance is concerned, whether or not the relevant 
experiential presentations are veridical. In the case of 
your BIV [brain in a vat] phenomenal duplicate, for 
instance, the perceptual-experiential presentations are 
radically illusory: there are no real objects that are 
really perceived by that experiencing subject and that 
really instantiate the relevant properties and relations. 
But no matter: your BIV’s duplicate’s perceptual 
experience acquaints the BIV with shape-properties 
and relative-position properties just as much as your 
own perceptual experience does, even though this 
acquaintance occurs via radically non-veridical ex- 
periences of merely apparent instantiations of these 
properties and relations by merely apparent objects. 
And for the BIV, such experiential acquaintance with 
the properties and relations grounds mental reference 
to  them—just  as  it  does  for  you.  Experientially 
presented apparent instantiation of the properties and 
relations suffices to acquaint the experiencing subject 
with them, and thus suffices to ground mental refer- 
ence to them, whether or not the experiencing subject 
is ever experientially presented with actual instan- 
tiations of them. (Horgan et al. 2004) 
Let me begin with two terminological points about the use 
of ‘acquaintance’ in this passage, which I will initially set 
aside. First, it refers to ‘acquaintance’ with properties and 
‘experiential presentations’ of property instantiations. There 
may be a distinction akin to Russell’s here, between our 
relation to things and property instances, on the one hand, 
and what he called the ‘fifth kind of acquaintance’, ac- 
quaintance with universals, where this is what he said is 
required for understanding the concepts that refer to prop- 
erties, on the other. I will ignore this initially, as it does not 
mater for current purposes. Secondly, it is not clear whether 
‘acquaintance’ is meant, as it is for both Russell and the 
relationalist, to refer to a relation we have to properties and/ 
or their instantiation that is unmediated by a mode of pre- 
sentation, or sense. As I understand it, a key ingredient in the 
phenomenal intentionalist approach is commitment to a 
representationalism that says that all references are mediated 
by a mode of presentation, which makes appeal to ‘ac- 
quaintance’ somewhat confusing, relative to its historical 
philosophical meaning. Again, I initially set this aside. 
Glossing over these issues, I will refer to ‘presentations of 
instances of properties’ to cover both what the relationalist 
and the phenomenal intentionalist thinks occurs when we 
have perceptual experiences as of instances of properties 
such as ‘square’ or ‘red’. 
With this in place, the main difference between the two 
approaches can be summarized as follows. The phe- 
nomenal intentionalist thinks that in perceptual experience 
we are presented with apparent objects and apparent in- 
stantiations—something that occurs also when there is no 
actual object or actual perception. The relationalist, in 
contrast, says that in perceptual experience we are pre- 
sented with actual (‘real’) objects and their actual (‘real’) 
apparent properties. (So, for the relationalist, whatever 
account we should give of the phenomenology of experi- 
ences, if they have any, of brains in vats, or of experiences 
that are not perceptual, it is distinct from the one we should 
give of perceptual  experiences.) 
The key distinction, relative to our immediate concerns, 
is that between apparent instantiations of properties and 
actual (‘real) instantiations of apparent properties.15 For 
the purposes of making vivid the significance of this dis- 
tinction when comparing the phenomenalist and the rela- 
tionalist accounts of perceptual experience,  I will take  the 
 
 
 
 
14  
See e.g. Campbell (2011) and Phillips (2014). 
15 
For an excellent discussion of closely related distinctions  and 
issues see Martin (2010). 
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kind of relational approach I have in mind to be committed 
to arguing for some version or other of the following 
claims. 
1. It is part and parcel of our ‘commonsense realism’ 
about the world around us that we take the various 
located objects that populate our world to have 
apparent properties. That is, we take it that the objects 
we perceive are, in Strawson’s terms ‘phenomenally- 
propertied’; they have ‘visual shapes and felt textures’ 
(Strawson 1979: 54). Or, as Ayer puts it, the objects we 
think of as inhabiting the mind-independent world we 
perceive are conceived of as ‘visuo-tactile continuants’ 
(Ayer 1973). 
2. The objects around us have such properties. That is, 
our commonsense view of the world around us is 
correct insofar as we are right to treat such properties 
as properties of mind-independent  objects. 
3. The actual (‘real’) property instances we see are 
instances of apparent properties. That is, what we 
consciously perceive are instances of ‘shapes-as-seen’ 
or ‘as-felt’, ‘colours-as-seen’, and so forth. In percep- 
tual experience, it is instances of such properties that 
determine the contours of our phenomenology, by 
being presented to us through acquaintance.
16
 
4. Our perceptual experiences are transparent to such 
property instances. That is why we can consult our 
perceptual experience to find out about the world 
around us.
17
 
What about phenomenal intentionalists? I take it they 
will not deny (1). (Even Ayer, who thinks we are wrong to 
be commonsense realists, and claims that objects don’t 
really have these kinds of properties, agrees this we think 
they do.) What about (2)–(4)? The following passage, a 
footnote to the passage quoted above, is helpful. 
You, your Twin Earth phenomenal duplicate, and 
your BIV phenomenal duplicate all have phe- 
nomenally matching color-experience: apparent ob- 
jects are experientially presented as having the same 
color-appearances. But  this leaves open 
(i) what properties colors themselves are, (ii) whether 
there are such properties at all, and (iii) whether 
mental reference to color-properties (if there are any) 
is constituted purely phenomenally, or instead has an 
externalistic aspect. (Horgan et al.  2004) 
 
16 
Not all versions of relationalism speak of acquaintance with 
property instances. This is relevant to claim (3) below, too. See, e.g., 
Brewer (2011), who restricts the use of ‘acquaintance’ to our relation 
to objects. However, they would all deliver an account of what it is to 
be presented with property instances that would yield materials for 
rejecting the phenomenal intentionalist  account. 
17 For this kind of appeal to ‘transparency’ in connection with colour, 
see,  e.g., Campbell (2005). 
If we read ‘colour appearances’ as ‘apparent colours’, 
this passage suggests agnosticism, at best, about (2) and 
(3). Alternatively, we might take ‘colour appearances’ to 
refer to an experiential way of representing colour. Again 
this would suggest agnosticism at best about (2) and (3). 
Either way, we can conclude that (4) would be rejected. 
For all experience tells us, apparent colours, shapes and so 
forth, colours and shapes as they appear to us, are not 
instantiated by the real objects we perceive. 
This rejection of (4) captures the most important dif- 
ference between the two approaches when we turn, finally, 
to the background question that has concerned us 
throughout. Does phenomenal consciousness have a con- 
stitutive role in delivering objective import? (The objective 
import of a perception, recall, is whatever it is about it that 
enables us to make non-inferential judgments about the 
mind-independent world.) Burge*’s challenge was: either 
accept the Caused Representation claim, and reject a role 
for phenomenal consciousness in securing such import; or 
reject Caused Representation (and, possibly, defend such a 
role for consciousness). If the position just outlined cap- 
tures at least some of what the phenomenal intentionalist 
thinks, then one thing we can say is that the phenomenal 
intentionalism on its own does not provide a way out of this 
dilemma. True, phenomenal intentionalists insist that 
conscious perceptions have a distinctive kind of phe- 
nomenal representational content. But this on its own does 
not give consciousness a role in delivering objective im- 
port, and hence does not provide a way of avoiding the 
dilemma. Indeed the particular account just sketched ap- 
pears to rule out such a role. To put it in terms of the 
sceptical challenge discussed earlier: on the phenomenal 
intentionalist’s characterisation of phenomenal conscious- 
ness in perception, conscious perceivers are in no better a 
position than the blindseer in responding to the sceptic’s 
challenge to justify the claim that they are currently per- 
ceiving an instance of red rather than a structural 
equivalent. 
The phenomenal intentionalist will respond that con- 
sciousness on its own is anyway not intended, on her the- 
ory, to secure objective import. She will say that she 
endorses Caused Representation, along with Burge*, but 
that, contra Burge*, holds that the suitably caused repre- 
sentations must be conscious, along the lines just de- 
scribed. We have objective import when conscious 
intentional states are caused by objects in fact perceived. 
Causation does the work of securing the link with the ‘real’ 
external world. This is the sense in which she rejects the 
dilemma. 
The problem with this response is that nothing in the 
account offered of what phenomenal intentionality is does 
anything to address directly Burge*’s Challenge to show 
what it is that consciousness gives us, as far as objective 
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import is concerned, that is not provided by non-conscious 
perceptions. Phenomenal consciousness, as described by 
this theory, seems inert on this front. 
An alternative for the phenomenal intentionalist is to 
hold onto the account offered of conscious intentional 
contents, but to endorse, in addition, and in distinction, 
something like Burge’s account of the content responsible 
for objective perceptual import. Thus, two of the chief 
exponents of phenomenal intentionality, Horgan and 
Kriegel, say that various mental states, in addition to 
having phenomenal intentional contents, also have ‘exter- 
nalistic’, non-phenomenal contents, accounted for roughly 
in terms that comply with Burge’s version of Caused 
Representation claim.
18 
So they may be happy to give  such 
contents the role of securing objective import, bypassing 
consciousness altogether, and not really proposing a way 
out of the  dilemma. 
The trouble with this kind of response, though, besides 
the fact that it isn’t addressing the dilemma, is that it does 
not sit easily with the general rhetoric of taking con- 
sciousness seriously and treating it as the ‘fundamental 
form of intentionality’. At least in the case of perception, 
surely one pre-theoretic reason for thinking perceptual 
consciousness is fundamental is that it puts us in touch with 
the world we perceive, in a way non-conscious perceptions 
do not—or, as I have been putting it, that it delivers a 
distinctive kind of objective import. Commitment to the 
claim that we are presented in perceptual experience only 
with ‘apparent instances’ of properties, in a way that may 
not tell us anything about what we are in fact perceiving, 
deprives the phenomenal intentionalist of this role for 
consciousness. 
To my knowledge, the kind of relationalist position I 
have been sketching is not discussed as an alternative op- 
tion in the intentional phenomenalist literature. There are 
doubtless many a priori theoretical commitments, such as 
commitment to the CTP, to the narrowness of content and 
so forth, which hide this option from view. However, given 
the centrality the relationalist gives to consciousness, I 
suggest it is a task the phenomenal intentionalist should 
undertake, to explain which of claims (2)–(4) she rejects, 
and why. 
There are, as I see it, two main issues here. The first is an 
issue in the philosophy of mind: the relationalist insists, 
and the phenomenal intentionalist denies, that not all 
subjectively significant relations to the world are mediated 
by personal-level representations. In particular, in this 
context, perceptual consciousness, the relationalist claims, 
should not be explained in this way, but rather, by appeal to 
a non-representational relation of acquaintance. This is 
where we return to the major question I earlier shelved 
 
18  
See e.g. Horgan et al. (2004), and Kriegel and Horgan (2008). 
about what the phenomenal intentionalist means by ‘ac- 
quaintance.’ This is not an issue that can or should be 
skirted. If talk of ‘acquaintance’ is just another way of 
talking about ‘experiential modes of presentation’, the 
problem of the gap between of mode of presentation and 
what is represented remains, wherever we locate the 
property represented, where this gap deprives conscious- 
ness of a role in securing objective import.
19 
If, on  the  
other hand, it is meant to be the kind of relation to property 
instantiations  that  the  relationalist  has  in  mind,  then: 
(a) this amounts to relinquishing a major theoretical com- 
mitment of phenomenal intentionalism, as it is usually 
presented—that is, the commitment to ‘representational- 
ism’; and (b) we need an account of why we cannot be 
acquainted with properties instantiated by ‘real’ perceived 
objects. Mere reiteration of the CTP at this point won’t do 
this on its own, as it is precisely its truth that is being 
challenged by the  relationalist. 
The second issue is metaphysical, and presents a chal- 
lenge to both sides of the debate. The relationalist insists 
that the world around us is ‘phenomenally propertied’. The 
phenomenal intentionalist must either say that our com- 
monsense view of the world is wrong and/or incoherent, 
and explain why; or endorse commonsense realism, and 
then explain how she can justify the adoption of com- 
monsense realism without appeal to acquaintance with 
actual/real instances of apparent properties. The main 
challenge the relationalist faces, on the other hand, if re- 
lationalism is to justify a role for consciousness in securing 
objective import, is to make good the claim that a ‘phe- 
nomenally propertied’ world can, in whatever sense is re- 
quired for the mind-independence of the object and 
properties perceived, be the same world as that described 
by science. 
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